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COMMODITY BUNDLING AND MONOPOLY 477 tinctive normative consequences. On the one hand, bundling could lead monopolists to oversupply as well as undersupply specific commodities: equilibrium output could fall on either side of ideal output. On the other hand, bundling could lead monopolists to sell whatever output is produced to the wrong people, in the sense that potential gains from trade among cusumers would exist in equilibrium. Hence the conditions for distributive efficiency as well as those for allocative efficiency might be violated. Neither Pigouvian first-degree price discrimination nor simple monopoly pricing results in either of these problems. These findings are discussed in Section III.
Third, the existence of commodity bundling seriously complicates public appraisal of monopoly, for it impairs the validity of major tools of applied welfare economics, such as consumer-producer surplus analysis and hedonic price indices. Finally, prohibition of bundling in monopolistic markets, without elimination of monopoly, can either increase or decrease the deadweight loss arising in the relevant markets. This reinforces the desirability of a structural, as opposed to conduct, attack on market power. We discuss these implications of commodity bundling in Section IV.
II. THE MODEL: POSITIVE PROPERTIES
Consider a model with the following characteristics. Technology is such that Al holds.
Al. (Technology) The marginal cost of supplying each good separately (c1, c2) is invariant with respect to output, and the marginal cost of supplying the two goods in a bundle is the sum of the component costs (CB = c1 + c2). There are no fixed costs.
Tastes are such that for all individuals A2 and A3 hold. A2. (Indivisibility) The marginal utility of a second unit of either commodity is zero.
A3. (Independence) The reservation price for a package comprised of one unit of each commodity (rB) is equal to the sum of their separate reservation prices (r1, r2).6 By assumption, therefore, this model excludes both economies in the bundling process and complementarity in consumption. If bundling is found to be profitable, it cannot be explained by these phenomena.
If the monopolist knows the reservation price of each consumer for each commodity, his profit-maximizing strategy is simply Pi-6. We assume here that any individual would be indifferent between consuming both goods 1 and 2 and a package consisting of these two goods. In other words, a package is identical to the sum of its component parts from the consumer's point of view.
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gouvian first-degree price discrimination with respect to each commodity separately. If the monopolist knows only the distribution of reservation prices in the population, however, or if he is legally prevented from engaging in pure price discrimination, then his ideal pricing strategy is more difficult to establish. Three options open to him are as follows.
1. Set the single price on each commodity separately, (p*, p*), which yields the greatest profits. We call this a pure components strategy, or simple monopoly pricing.
2. Offer the two commodities for sale only in a package comprised of one unit of each at the price p* chosen so as to maximize profits. This is the pure bundling strategy.
3. Combine strategies one and two by offering each commodity separately and a package of both, at a set of prices (pt, p2, pB), which maximizes overall profits. This is the mixed bundling strategy. Since the value of a bundle to consumers is no greater than the value of its components, mixed bundling is a distinct strategy only if the package is sold at a discount relative to its components. Each of these strategies is easily represented in diagrammatic form.
The reservation price of each consumer for each commodity can Figure I . If the monopolist adopts the pure components strategy, and sets component prices p* and p ( Figure  I ), the population is sorted into four groups: individuals with reservation prices at least equal to market prices for both commodities (Area A in Figure I ), individuals with reservation prices less than market prices for both commodities (Area C), and individuals with reservation price at least equal to market price for one but not the other commodity (Areas B and D). Those in Area A purchase both goods, those in Areas B and D purchase goods 2 and 1, respectively, and individuals in Area C purchase neither good. If instead the monopolist adopts the pure bundling strategy, the population is sorted into only two groups: those whose reservation price for the bundle (rB = r1 + r2) is at least equal to the bundle's market price, and those for whom the opposite is true. In Figure II bundle price appears in reservation price space as a straight line with both intercepts equal to the bundle price p* and hence with a slope of minus one. Those in Area A buy the bundle and hence consume both goods. Those in Area B do not buy the bundle and hence consume neither good.7 7. The sorting of consumers depicted in Figure II assumes The pure components strategy never violates Exclusion because within the framework of our model prices in component markets are never set below cost.10 As we show below, this virtue of simple monopoly pricing is not shared by its bundling rivals. On the other hand, the pure components strategy violates Extraction or Inclusion as long as customers are distributed in reservation price space such that the monopolist faces downward-sloping demand curves in both component markets: the finite elasticity of demand curves implies that monopolists cannot extract all consumer surplus on a particular good without preventing some individuals with valuation in excess of cost from consuming it. This violates Inclusion.
If the bundle demand curve is extremely elastic while the component demand curves are not, pure bundling avoids excessive violation of Inclusion and Extraction. This proposition is illustrated in Figure IV common valuation of the bundle by his customers, he can satisfy the extraction and inclusion requirements simultaneously by charging each customer a price equal to that amount for the bundle." The chief defect of pure bundling is its difficulty in complying with Exclusion. The greater the cost of supplying either good, the greater the possibility of supplying some individuals with commodities for which reservation price falls short of cost. In Figure IV , A and D are individuals with ri < ci for some commodity. Thus, pure bundling 11. The pure bundling strategy is analytically equivalent to an all-or-none offer. In both cases a package of commodities is offered to the consumer on a "take it or leave it" basis.
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is preferred to simple monopoly pricing only if the greater profits accruing from more complete extraction or inclusion are not outweighed by the lower profits due to less complete exclusion. The more negligible are costs relative to reservation prices, the less of a problem this poses for pure bundling.
The mixed bundling strategy is more profitable than its pure counterpart whenever Exclusion is violated in the pure bundling equilibrium. The reason is that creation of separate component markets adds two categories into which the monopolist can sort his customers. In Figure IV , for example, he can charge prices p* = 90 and P* = 90 in the component markets, thereby inducing individuals A and D to cease consuming the good they value below cost but continue consuming the good they value above cost. In general, whenever the exclusion requirement is violated in a pure bundling equilibrium, mixed bundling is necessarily preferred to pure bundling. 12 That mixed bundling satisfies Exclusion more completely than does pure bundling, however, does not mean that mixed bundling avoids the problem altogether. Rarely does a monopolist find it profitable to exclude every individual whose reservation price for a good falls short of its cost. The reason is apparent in Figure V , which is identical to Figure IV except for the presence of consumers E and F. Mixed bundling is still the most profitable strategy, but Exclusion is unfulfilled in the cases of E and F. To exclude them from the bundle market proves too costly in terms of consumer surplus foregone on A and D. Another way of putting this is that the component demand curves are downward-sloping and hence successive price reductions on a given component usually reduce total revenue in that component market. Like pure bundlers, therefore, mixed bundlers face a trade-off between more complete extraction and more complete exclusion. The dilemma is simply less pronounced in the case of mixed bundling.
If customers are distributed in reservation price space such that people with high reservation prices for the package exhibit small variance in their valuations of the components, and vice versa, then mixed bundling has another virtue relative to pure bundling: it fa-12. The proof of this assertion proceeds as follows. Assume that the monopolist adopts a pure bundling strategy and sets a price of p*. Assume further that there exists some consumer i for whom r, + r2 > PB and r2 < c2 -, where > 0. If the monopolist now adopts a mixed bundling strategy, with prices PB and P1 = PB -C2 + E, he necessarily earns more profits than under pure bundling: profits are unchanged on individuals for whom rI + r2 > PB and r2 > PB -p1, since they consume the bundle in both cases. Profits are increased, however, on individuals for whom r1 + r2 > PB and r2 < p pi, since they bring in pi -cl = PB -CB + apiece instead of just* CB. Profits are also increased on individuals for whom r1 + r2 < pB and r1 > p1, since they previously consumed nothing but now generate Pi -c1 in profits apiece. All other individuals consume nothing in both cases. simple monopoly pricing is less profitable than mixed bundling. This illustrates the general proposition that pure components pricing is a more desirable strategy the greater the cost of violating Exclusion.14 In sum, each of the three pricing strategies has both advantages and disadvantages in relation to the other two. Whether one generates more profits than another depends on the prevailing level of costs and on the distribution of customers in reservation price space. In numerous experiments with plausible cost structures and continuous distributions of reservation prices, we found some form of bundling to be more profitable than simple monopoly pricing.15 Thus, commodity bundling can be expected to occur in the real world under more than the highly particular circumstances discussed here. 16 We are now in a position to understand why a restaurant might offer complete dinners as well as an a la carte menu. Some people value an appetizer relatively highly (soup on a cold day), others may value dessert relatively highly (Baked Alaska, unavailable at home), but all might wish to pay roughly the same amount for a complete dinner. The a la carte menu is designed to capture consumer surplus from those gastronomes with extremely high valuations of particular dishes, while the complete dinner is designed to retain those with lower variance in their reservation prices.
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With slight changes in interpretation, our model can be used to explain why products like toothpaste are sold in multiple container sizes. The horizontal axis in such cases measures an individual's reservation price for a first unit of the good, while the vertical axis measures his reservation price for an additional unit of the same good, given that he consumes a first unit. These definitions guarantee that 14. It is also possible, although less probable, that taste considerations alone render pure components pricing more profitable than mixed bundling. This is illustrated by the following example. Assume that five consumers-A, B, C, D, and E-have reservation prices of (80, 80), (75, 75), (45, 45), (75, 5), and (5, 75). Assume that c1 = c2 = 0. The pure components strategy with p* = p2 = 75 generates profits of 450. Although a bundle could be offered at a price of 90 in order to induce C to enter the market, gains from the inclusion of C would be outweighed by the loss of revenue on sales to A and B. Furthermore, increasing prices in components markets in conjunction with introduction of a bundle would not increase profits either. The point of this example is to suggest that there exist some distributions of tastes consistent with any strategy ranking as long as Exclusion is violated by none of the options.
15. To demonstrate this, we explored the profitability of bundling when individual reservation prices for the two components follow the joint normal distribution. Our experiments covered a wide range of parameters of the taste distribution and a wide range of cost structures. Suffice it to say that, for every characterization of tastes we studied, bundling in some form was preferred to pure components pricing for some cost conditions. Less complete explorations of tastes following the uniform and chisquare distributions were consistent with this result.
16. Using attendance data on first-run movies for various cities, Stigler attempted to show that real world tastes are such that the block booking practice of movie distributors can be explained by a model of this type. See Stigler, op. cit. 489 assumptions A1-A3 can be satisfied.'7 Note, however, that what comprises "one unit" of a good is inherently arbitrary. Moreover, customers must lie below the 45-degree line in reservation price space so as to comply with the law of diminishing marginal rates of substitution. Finally, the monopolist must charge the same price in both separates markets. Whenever mixed bundling occurs in toothpastetype situations, the monopolist is engaging in price discrimination by offering quantity discounts. Individuals with high reservation prices for the first ounce and low reservation prices for the second ounce have lower price elasticities of demand than do those with more equal valuations of successive units. Offering both one-and two-ounce containers thus induces individuals with inelastic demand to pay a high unit price in the component market, while individuals with elastic demand pay a low unit price in the bundle market.18
Our model also provides a plausible explanation of why automobile manufacturers add luxury to at least some of their vehicles. If the horizontal axis of reservation price space is defined as valuation of transport services, while the vertical axis is defined as the valuation of added luxury, assumptions A1-A3 can be satisfied.'9 In such situations the monopolist could offer just a basic car, just a luxury car, or both. Since the last strategy is equivalent to mixed bundling, it is usually the most profitable of the three.20 That explains why consumer 17. Note how this incarnation of the model can be used to treat divisible goods, even though they appear to be excluded by assumption A2. In the limiting case of perfect divisibility, bundling is equivalent to imposing nonlinear budget constraints on consumers. The nonlinearity stems from the fact that the average unit price of toothpaste depends on the quantity of toothpaste consumed. The important point here is that bundling can be profitable in a world of divisible commodities for exactly the reasons set forth here.
18. This point is made in Salop, op. cit. 20. In this situation it is rarely in the monopolist's interest to offer only a basic car. The reason is that as long as some consumer values luxury in excess of cost, profits can be increased by offering a luxury, as well as a basic, car. The proof is as follows. Assume that the monopolist offers a basic car at price p*. Assume further that there exists an individual with r, > p* and r2 > c2 + E, > 0' If the monopolist introduces a luxury car with price PB = Pt + C2 + c, all consumers with r> 2 p; and r2 -PB -P1 continue to purchase only good 1. Profits on these sales are unchanged. All consumers with r1 > p and r2 > PB-Pi now purchase the bundle instead of the basic car. Profits on these sales rise from (p -c) to (PB -C1 -C2 = Pi-C, + E). In addition, individuals with r, < p* and r, + r2 > PB now consume the bundle instead of nothing. Since PB > cB, greater profits are earned on these individuals. In situations of the car variety pure bundling is likely to be more profitable relative to mixed bundling than in cases of the restaurant type. However, the existence of any consumer in pure bundling equilibrium with r2 < c2 still suffices to guarantee the superiority of mixed bundling.
Note how this incarnation of the model can be used to treat complementarity even though it appears to be excluded by
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goods' manufacturers typically sell their product in both differentiated and undifferentiated form.21
In conclusion, we have shown that commodity bundling is more profitable than simple monopoly pricing in a wide variety of circumstances. The reason is that it often permits more complete extraction of consumer surplus than is possible under a pure components strategy. Price discrimination is another technique designed to achieve that result. What are the relative merits of these two schemes? Package selling has two virtues when compared with price discrimination. First, it requires far less information to implement. For example, Pigouvian first-degree price discrimination could be practiced only if the monopolist knows the reservation prices of each individual for each commodity. Needless to say, individuals have a strong incentive to conceal such information whenever possible. Commodity bundling, on the other hand, can be practiced even if the monopolist knows only the joint distribution of reservation prices in the population. Such information is sufficient to calculate the most profitable bundle and component prices. In a bundling context the price structure is such that individuals automatically sort themselves into distinct reservation price groups and thereby reveal truthful information concerning their tastes. In this sense commodity bundling serves as a self-selection device.22
Second, since each person pays the same price for what he consumes as do all others purchasing the same market basket, price discrimination laws based on price differentials alone are not violated. Unlike pure price discrimination, therefore, commodity bundling leaves its practitioner immune from prosecution. each commodity be just sufficient to supply all consumers with reservation prices at least equal to the marginal cost of that commodity. It is well-known that simple monopoly pricing violates the second but not the first of these requirements. Commodity bundling can violate either or both. Since the precise defects of bundling depend on which case-restaurant, toothpaste, or car-is under consideration, we shall discuss the normative consequences of each case separately. In cases of the restaurant type, where each component can in principle be disembodied from the bundle, package selling typically results in distributive inefficiency. This is illustrated in Figure IX 
Consumers located in the area AHpjE, for example, do not consume good 1, while individuals northeast of FAEp*' do. And yet, some individuals in the former area (e.g., X) value good 1 more highly than do some individuals in the latter area (e.g., Y). Thus, mutual gains from trade of good 1 for money between X and Y are possible, violating the distributive efficiency criterion. The same reasoning applies to distribution of good 2. Insofar as it leads to distributive inefficiency, commodity bundling shares certain normative properties with (imperfect) price discrimination.24
In cases of the restaurant type commodity bundling also results in allocative inefficiency. Unlike simple monopoly pricing, however, bundling can lead to oversupply as well as undersupply of either or both commodities. This, too, is illustrated in Figure IX . All consumers located east of c1c should consume good 1. In mixed bundling equilibrium, though, it is individuals northeast of FAEpj who in fact consume good 1. If FABcI contains more customers than does c1BEpj4 then good 1 is oversupplied. If not, the reverse is true. Economically, a necessary if insufficient condition for oversupply of good 1 is that equilibrium prices bear the relationship p* -p* < c1 so that the shadow price of good 1 when consumed in bundles is less than its opportunity cost. By similar reasoning the necessary and sufficient25 conditions for undersupply of good 1 are pi > c1 and pB -p2 > c1. Since the same logic prevails in analyzing good 2, commodity bundling can lead to oversupply of both commodities, undersupply of both commodities, or oversupply of one and undersupply of the other. In sum, commodity bundling generally leads to welfare losses when compared with perfect competition. But this does not imply that banning package selling per se decreases the burden of monopoly. In Figure V , for example, mixed bundling is the most profitable strategy. The associated deadweight welfare loss is 7.28 If bundling were prohibited and the monopolist forced to adopt a pure components strategy, the associated welfare loss would be 60 instead. Thus, prohibition of bundling without more might make society worse off. In fact, within the framework of our model, whenever mixed bundling is equivalent to pure price discrimination, it is Pareto optimal. Simple monopoly pricing never is. The possibility that mixed bundling is Pareto optimal is illustrated in Figure IV .
The deadweight loss associated with bundling might also exceed the corresponding loss associated with simple monopoly pricing. This possibility is illustrated in Figure VII . The profit-maximizing strategy for a monopolist is mixed bundling. And yet, the deadweight loss associated with that strategy (i.e., 10) exceeds that associated with the most profitable pure components strategy (i.e., 8). In this case, therefore, inability to bundle on the part of the monopolist would decrease the burden of monopoly.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In the movie Five Easy Pieces, Jack Nicholson enters a diner to purchase some toast and coffee. The waitress informs him that toast alone is not available, even though both bread and toaster are on the. premises. Nicholson is forced to order a chicken salad sandwich without chicken, lettuce, or mayonnaise.
Our purpose here has been to explain this and other forms of commodity bundling, such as vacation packages, chrome on cars, and quantity discounts. We have demonstrated that a monopolist's urge to charge customers their reservation prices for each of his products could lead to package selling. We have also demonstrated that bundling is inefficient by Pareto standards: it can lead to oversupply or undersupply of particular goods, and it can lead to the wrong people consuming each good. In this section we present some implications of commodity bundling for public policy analysis.
The first step in social appraisal of monopoly is to ascertain the sources and magnitude of the welfare loss it generates. That is the function of certain tools of applied welfare economics, such as consumer-producer surplus analysis and hedonic price indices. Unfortunately, the reliability of both such tools is seriously jeopardized when monopolists practice commodity bundling.
28. We calculated welfare loss as follows: the total loss is equal to the difference between consumer surplus in pure competition and the sum of consumer surplus and profits in the monopoly equilibrium. (1) is applied at the bundle level, dxilaz = 0, so that estimated welfare loss is zero. This follows from the fact that the bundle demand curve is completely inelastic at prices below unity; hence the usual "triangle" measuring the deadweight loss vanishes entirely. In this example the formula not only underestimates welfare loss but fails even to detect its presence.
These defects of the consumer-producer surplus approach have two implications for public policy analysis. First, society may be unaware of the true extent of -the burden of monopoly.30 Second, even if society knows the extent of welfare loss, it may fail to pinpoint its source.31 This could set governments on the wrong policy track, since 29. Mixed bundling generates more profits in this situation, but its appraisal via equation (1) is more complicated.
30. The Harberger formula provides neither a floor nor a ceiling to the true burden of monopoly; it can be shown that in situations where bundling is profitable, deadweight loss can be overestimated or underestimated by equation (1). 31. Conceptually, the loss associated with allocative inefficiency should be measured as the net gain in producer and consumer surplus that results from increasing (decreasing) component outputs to their optimal levels, given the correct distribution of output among individuals. The loss associated with distributive inefficiency should be measured as the net gain in consumer surplus that results from redistribution of existing output.
